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as an academic bioentrepreneur, you will face many challenges. At the very least, 
you must identify a novel and valuable life 
science opportunity, create a viable business 
model, build a team with technical and busi-
ness acumen, manage resources and orches-
trate partnerships, communicate your team’s 
legitimacy to customers and stakeholders, 
as well as effectively ‘pivot’ as circumstances 
evolve (or, in other words, have the vision and 
courage to dramatically change your research 
or business strategy before your company runs 
into the ground)1,2.
In addition, you will most likely have to 
negotiate with your university’s technology 
transfer office (TTO) to license the intellectual 
property (IP) related to your research. Keep in 
mind that technology transfer regimes and 
policies regarding ownership of IP rights vary 
substantially across academic institutions for 
a variety of reasons. And that university TTOs 
in the United States and the United Kingdom 
govern themselves by different strategic and 
operational models3.
This administrative complexity and opac-
ity in university technology transfer presents 
an extra obstacle to academic entrepreneurs 
who already face a multitude of technical and 
commercial hurdles before their discovery 
can reach the marketplace. The best way to 
overcome these issues is to be fully informed 
before initiating negotiations with your TTO. 
We hope the information in this article will bet-
ter prepare you to meet these challenges.
Overcoming information asymmetries
Securing a license for your university discov-
ery is an essential step in the quest to  com-
mercialize that discovery, and it can also help 
you raise capital and form strategic partner-
ships. You must therefore learn to effectively 
engage and negotiate with TTOs and deter-
mine reasonable deal terms (such as royalty 
rates and equity) for the technology at hand.
First-time academic bioentrepreneurs fre-
quently confront a deal-making process 
they do not completely understand, in part 
because final deal terms are often held con-
fidential, making it difficult for outside 
observers to understand fair market terms. 
At the same time, bioentrepreneurs some-
times do not fully recognize how the inter-
ests of the TTO and university may diverge 
from their own. In fact, one postdoc we 
spoke to said, “Knowing what I know now 
about my university’s licensing process, I 
might have considered a different university 
for my postdoc.”
TTOs arguably benefit from information 
asymmetries in negotiations, whereas expe-
rienced bioentrepreneurs fear that disclosing 
details of prior deals could jeopardize their 
ongoing relationship with their TTO. Thus, 
they often stay silent on just how they got their 
asset outside the university walls.
Good advice can come from successful bio-
entrepreneurs or mentors within your network, 
but what to do if you don’t have anyone like that 
to consult with? How will you know what con-
stitutes a good deal? More generally, how can 
you gain better insight into the challenges you’re 
about to face?
At the Oxbridge Biotech Roundtable, our 
mission is to facilitate connections between aca-
demia and industry to move ideas forward. To 
help answer questions about the bioentrepre-
neurial process, we collected anonymous quali-
tative data from bioentrepreneurs in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, and also spoke 
to TTO executives, heads of university innova-
tion and entrepreneurship programs, venture 
capitalists and angel investors. The experiences 
of bioentrepreneurs reported here reveal that 
they have minimal structural bargaining lever-
age with their TTO. Because the TTO has full 
ownership of the technology, it approaches 
licensing with the risk perspective of an owner.
A daunting set of challenges
From these conversations, we’ve identified 
several key challenges for bioentrepreneurs in 
negotiations: a too-long licensing process, lack 
of business experience on the founding team, 
lack of funding, restrictive conflict of interest 
policies at universities and lack of access to 
experienced legal counsel. 
Long negotiations. The length of the licensing 
deal negotiation process can become a major 
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In this regard academics can run into difficul-
ties as the TTOs represent the interests of the 
university (not the academic), yet the academic 
is technically an employee of the university. 
“Our policy is to never negotiate directly with 
the faculty,” says a US-based TTO representa-
tive. This issue might be particularly preva-
lent in the United States because of increased 
numbers of entrepreneurial ventures and its 
stronger culture for litigation. To that end, our 
advice to you would be to reaffirm the need to 
seek advice before entering discussions with 
your TTO, and to always remember the TTO 
is seeking the best deal for the university not 
neccessarily for the academic or investors.
Experienced legal counsel. Finally, most bio-
entrepreneurs in our survey emphasized that 
retaining experienced legal counsel is invalu-
able during the negotiation process. Issues 
related to the quality of the complete IP pack-
age, including the scope, field of use and roy-
alty stacking are important elements and are 
often a source of disagreement between found-
ers and TTOs. As noted by a US-based survey 
respondent, “Entrepreneurs need to be careful 
of the quality of the IP they are getting from the 
TTO and should consult lawyers to vet it.” You 
must also consider whether the patent arose 
from sponsored or collaborative research; 
when ownership of IP is assigned to multiple 
institutions, negotiations with multiple institu-
tions for IP rights must necessarily ensue.
Bioentrepreneurs often fail to appreciate the 
opportunity cost to the TTO in outlicensing. 
If a technology is licensed to an ineffective 
team (particularly with an exclusive license), 
the university forgoes any success or revenue 
it may have received from licensing the tech-
nology to a better organized industry partner. 
Moreover, universities have limited resources 
and manpower to protect IP, and, for this rea-
son, prefer to license technology to teams they 
believe are well prepared to commercialize it. 
This conundrum has been termed the “keys 
to the kingdom” problem, in that a risk-averse 
university TTO may choose to wait indefinitely 
rather than hand over the ‘IP keys’ to a poorly 
prepared team.
Do our differences define us?
A notable disparity between the United 
Kingdom and United States is the availability 
of funds for academic startups. Our survey 
respondents felt that UK bioentrepreneurs 
are less able to secure early-stage funding 
than their US counterparts. “Companies that 
would struggle to raise $100,000 in the United 
Kingdom could easily get $1 million to $2 mil-
lion in the United States,” said a UK-based 
TTO representative. This may be due to the 
problem for entrepreneurs. Of 13 US-based 
bioentrepreneur survey respondents, 53% 
said their negotiation process took longer than 
6 months, and 38% cited the length of nego-
tiation as a major pain point. One US-based 
entrepreneur said, “It took us 18 months to 
negotiate with the TTO. That is too long when 
time is critical to protect the invention, raise 
money and establish a company.”
You can prepare yourself before entering 
negotiations by consulting experienced bio-
entrepreneurs and making yourself aware of 
their deals at other institutions. You should 
also be able to clearly articulate how your busi-
ness strategy is tailored to your technology and 
understand the socioeconomic impact of your 
technology. Also, be prepared to be patient.
Inexperience. The credibility of the entrepre-
neur is important when entering a partner-
ship with the TTO. As stated by one US TTO 
official, “Our faculties are academia people. 
They lack the business experience and do not 
know what reasonable financial expectations 
or description policies are.” A US-based TTO 
director told us that bioentrepreneurs often do 
not sufficiently research the market their prod-
uct will be entering—information about which 
is needed by both the TTO and investors. This 
sort of behavior does the bioentrepreneur no 
favors, as licensing deals are more likely to be 
completed if the TTO is dealing with an expe-
rienced and well-prepared team. Any concerns, 
and the TTO may hedge with higher upfront 
costs, limited exclusivity or milestone-based 
payments.
You can counter all this by preparing an 
adequate business plan or strategy for your 
IP before approaching your TTO. To enhance 
your knowledge and build credibility, start net-
working and taking advantage of institutional 
resources—such as mentorship and entrepre-
neurship programs, competitions and incuba-
tors—as early as possible. Consider bringing 
aboard team members with prior experience in 
life science commercialization to improve your 
team’s credibility. Having a seasoned, serial bio-
entrepreneur or experienced biopharma execu-
tive on your roster will enhance the perceived 
quality of the startup management team. As 
one UK-based venture capitalist remarked, “A 
management team is more important than the 
technology. Sometimes we see what we think 
is great technology but we just don’t believe the 
management team can make anything of it.”
Lack of funding. The most frequent problem 
cited by TTO officials in the United States and 
United Kingdom when deciding whether to 
close a licensing deal was a lack of investment 
or support for the startup in-licensing the asset. 
However, the need to secure funding before 
executing a license presents a seeming paradox, 
given that attracting funding often depends 
upon securing a prior licensing agreement. 
One solution in the United States has been 
the use of a license option agreement, which 
grants a prospective licensee a right to evaluate 
a patented technology and the option to enter 
into a full license agreement for the technology 
at some later point. Companies pay a modest 
fee to reserve the possibility (without incur-
ring the obligation) of formally licensing the 
technology for a specified period. It can also 
be difficult to attract an experienced manage-
ment team if your company has little profes-
sional investment, but having a clear business 
strategy and market research evidence can put 
you in a stronger position when approaching 
investors and potential hires. You should also 
research alternative option licenses and con-
sider sourcing funding from abroad.
Conflict of interest rules. Particularly in the 
United States, university researchers who wish 
to pursue the commercialization of their tech-
nology often run afoul of conflict of interest 
policies. These exist to prevent academics from 
playing both sides of a technology licensing 
deal or devoting too much time to nonaca-
demic obligations4. One US-based TTO rep-
resentative was of the opinion that “the main 
pain point [in this process] is the inventor’s 
divergence of interests and loyalty,” because the 
situation calls for “negotiating against the insti-
tution and, in many ways, against themselves.”
Box 1  The mature TTO
us ttos are now devising novel strategies to deal with the bioentrepreneurs’ equity split. 
several apply antidilution provisions until the spin-out company has reached a sizable  
funding level (usually series a). there are a few surprising industry-wide fads in licensing, 
including a recent tto trend of demanding undiluted equity percentages in the event of 
an ipo, sale or acquisition.
but it is unsurprising that us ttos are leading the way, given that, on average, us 
ttos are nine years older than their uK counterparts7. still, at least two uK-based ttos 
are now adopting models similar to these found across the atlantic, suggesting that these 
policies may soon be implemented in equity deals with uK bioentrepreneurs.
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Equity deal terms
Perhaps the most striking difference between 
the United States and United Kingdom is seen 
with equity deal terms. In the United Kingdom, 
a typical licensing deal is a rarely negotiable 
50:50 split between the university and the aca-
demic bioentrepreneur, whereas US interview-
ees often reported universities taking a 5–10% 
negotiable equity share.
To expand upon our survey data from entre-
preneurs, we researched the IP policies from 
100 US and UK universities and found guide-
lines for about half (Tables 1 and 2). University 
equity claims were not specified in the policy 
documents of many world-leading universi-
ties in the life sciences (and ergo top recipi-
ents of taxpayer-funded grants), including 
Harvard (Cambridge, MA, USA), Oxford and 
University College London (Supplementary 
Tables 1 and 2).
Many universities claimed at least a 
50% equity share (including Oxford, 
Imperial College London, the University of 
Massachusetts and the University of Texas sys-
tem), but US institutions are clearly more will-
ing to take a lower proportion of equity than 
UK institutions. The Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology and Washington University in St. 
Louis state they take at most 5% equity in spin-
outs, Carnegie Mellon University claims a max-
imum of 6%, and Stanford University and the 
University of California system claim a maxi-
mum of 10%. It should be noted that although 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison has not 
historically claimed ownership over any IP 
generated through research conducted by their 
staff and students, their policy states that own-
ership of all IP generated through externally 
funded research, which would account for the 
vast majority of their IP, is transferred to a des-
ignated patent management organization, the 
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation5 . The 
policies and deal structures of WARF were not 
publicly discoverable at the time of publication.
UK schools aimed for much higher portions. 
At the lowest end, the University of Cambridge, 
University of Dundee and Brunel University all 
sought 20% slices, fourfold higher than that of 
their lowest American counterparts.
Negotiating licensing deals
Our interviews with TTOs and bioentrepre-
neurs suggest that there are important differ-
ences in negotiating deals in the United States 
and the United Kingdom.
Factors to consider in US licensing deals. US 
founders often do not realize that some deal 
terms are negotiable, including upfront fees, 
option payments, equity, royalty  payments, 
milestone payments, territories covered, field 
less-established venture capital network of 
biotech investors in the United Kingdom and/
or higher expectations for success on the US 
side of the Atlantic. However, UK university 
spinouts can develop a network with inves-
tors and incubators abroad. Our advice to you 
would be to network at conferences attended 
by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, and 
reach out to seasoned bioentrepreneurs who 
are often very willing to help novice bioentre-
preneurs with advice and further introduc-
tions. Many of these events are often free, and 
even held on academic campuses. UK academ-
ics can seek support from US incubators, which 
also support and help other non-US high-tech 
companies, which is useful for developing a 
peer group that includes not only academics 
but also other entrepreneurs. (Although these 
differences exist today, TTOs are changing as 
they expand and grow; see Box 1.)
Table 1  Guideline university share of equity taken by selected US universitiesa
University
Guideline university  
equity share (%) Guideline type
university of Wisconsin-Madisonb 0 no ownership of ip claimed by 
university
Massachusetts institute of technologyb 5 Max.
Washington university in st. louis 5 Max.
Carnegie Mellon university 6 Max.
university of Californiac 10 Max.
stanford universityb 10 Max.
rockefeller university 15 Max.
university of north Carolina 15 Min.
City university of new York 20 Max.
oklahoma state university 20 Max.
north Carolina state university 25 Max.
university of Washingtonc 33 not stated as negotiable
texas state university 40 Min.
illinois state university 50 not stated as negotiable
new York universityc 50 not stated as negotiable
university of Maryland 50 negotiable
university of texasb 50 not stated as negotiable
Missouri state university 60 negotiable
university of illinois 60 not stated as negotiable
texas a & M university 63 negotiable
indiana state university 65 negotiable
university of rochesterc 65 Max.
Cornell university 67 not stated as negotiable
georgia institute of technology 67 not stated as negotiable
iowa state university 67 negotiable
emory university 67 not stated as negotiable
university of utah 67 Max.
georgetown university 70 Max.
Marshall university 70 negotiable
university of Massachusettsc 70 not stated as negotiable
university of pennsylvania 70 not stated as negotiable
brown university 72 not stated as negotiable
California institute of technology 100 not stated as negotiable
northwestern universityc not specified in policy
princeton universityc not specified in policy
Harvard university not specified in policy
Johns Hopkins university not specified in policy
penn state university not specified in policy
purdue university not specified in policy
tufts university not specified in policy
a61% (39 of 63) us universities researched specified a guideline percentage for the university’s share of equity in a spin-
out company using university ip. Full table with references are provided in Supplementary Table 1. the authors have made 
their best efforts to find the most up-to-date, publicly discoverable, online policy documents. buniversities ranked highly in 
gross licensing revenue but lacking information specific to life sciences in ref. 6. cuniversities named in ref. 6.
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is not always the case. In fact, many institute 
policies explicitly state that equity terms are 
negotiable (Table 2), and several of our sur-
vey respondents have reported that they were 
able to discuss terms. One UK-based TTO 
explained the apparent lack of flexibility this 
way: “If other TTOs say that they don’t nego-
tiate, I think that is because they are scared. 
They are trying to preserve their position in the 
negotiations. They don’t want to be on public 
record saying that they are willing to negotiate.”
Several UK entrepreneurs we spoke to felt 
that the non-negotiable, 50:50 split they were 
offered overestimated the contribution of the 
university to the venture. Still, this fixed rate 
does greatly simplify, and thus shorten, the 
initial negotiation time, the length of which 
is a major complaint of bioentrepreneurs in 
the United States. One UK TTO representa-
tive stated that “[we want to] actually build 
a business instead of spending a lot of time 
upfront negotiating something that isn’t actu-
ally worth anything.” Though one can argue the 
deal would move even swifter if the TTO took 
a less aggressive stand (for instance, asking for 
5% instead of 50%), which would allow the bio-
entrepreneur and investor to start the real work 
of building the company over the coming years, 
and rewarding them accordingly. Furthermore, 
a few UK-based bioentrepreneurs highlighted 
the nonequity-based benefits of their deals, 
such as increased research funding from the 
school.
Concluding remarks
In today’s economy, where early-stage ven-
tures grow by matching technology with the 
unfulfilled needs of markets, university-based 
bioentrepreneurs have much to contribute. 
Although many factors are involved in start-
ing a company and bringing a product to 
market, academic innovators require not just 
technical expertise, but an understanding of 
the mechanics, politics, and logistics of TTOs 
and of the technology licensing process. As 
we have noted, successful spinouts must clear 
several challenging hurdles, including finding 
comparable deal terms for reference, satisfy-
ing demanding university conflict of interest 
policies and presenting a credible business plan 
to sophisticated investors, busy TTO officials 
and experienced industry professionals. As one 
bioentrepreneur who weathered this process 
cautioned, “It will take ten times longer and 
cost ten times more than you think.”
From our study it is also clear that there are 
differences in the behaviours of US and UK 
TTOs. It is difficult to understand the justi-
fication of UK TTOs, such as Oxford’s Isis 
Innovation, taking 50% of a company’s equity 
at formation—which after investment can leave 
of use and exclusivity versus nonexclusiv-
ity. They also do not always appreciate that 
agreements can be renegotiated after they are 
signed. Check your university policy; your 
university might offer a lower upfront pay-
ment in exchange for higher royalty rates or 
vice versa. In our survey, several bioentrepre-
neurs mentioned that they were able to negoti-
ate payments and duration for options before 
fully licensing the technology. In some cases, 
the upfront payment option had been deferred 
altogether. Remember to be flexible—several 
US-based TTOs explained that a company 
without funds could get an option or license 
agreement by accepting highly structured mile-
stones in lieu of payments.
However, although there are variations 
around the basic structure of deals, and negoti-
ations might tilt toward the academic entrepre-
neurs or the university prolonged negotiations 
often revert to the mean  in the United States. 
One US-based attorney suggested that variance 
in deal terms are mainly due to the inexperi-
ence of one of the parties involved. So know 
your averages, but don’t be timid about asking 
for what you need.
Factors to consider in UK licensing deals. In 
the UK, licensing deal equity terms are often 
perceived as being non-negotiable, though this 
Table 2  Guideline university share of equity taken by selected UK universitiesa (%)
University Guideline university share of equity Guideline type
university of Cambridge (rg) 20b negotiableb
brunel university 20 non-negotiable
university of dundee 20 Min.
Heriot-Watt university 24 negotiable
university of York (rg) 25 negotiable
newcastle university (rg) 25
university of exeter (rg) 25 Max.c
university of Manchester (rg) 30 negotiable
university of leeds (rg) 30 non-negotiable
King’s College london (rg) 50 Max.
university of glasgow (rg) 50 non-negotiable
aston university 50 Max.
City university london 50 negotiable
northumbria university 50 negotiable
university of reading 50 negotiable
university of the West of england, bristol 50 negotiable
imperial College london (rg) 50d negotiabled
university of edinburgh (rg) 50d negotiabled
university of oxford (rg) 50b negotiable (rarely)b
university of Warwick (rg) 50b non-negotiableb
university of leicester 51 Min.
Queen Mary, university of london (rg) 60 negotiable
swansea university 60d negotiabled
university of Cardiff (rg) 60d negotiabled
university of liverpool (rg) 60 non-negotiable
university of nottingham (rg) 60 negotiable
university of sussex 60 Max.
university of sheffield (rg) 60d negotiabled
university of birmingham (rg) 60
university of bath (rg) 67 non-negotiable
university College london (rg) not specified in policy
university of bristol (rg) did not respond to inquiry
university of durham (rg) no official published guidelines
university of southampton (rg) not specified in policy
university of st andrews not specified in policy
a64% (24 of 37) uK universities researched specified a guideline percentage for the university’s share of equity in a spin-
out company using university ip in a publicly accessible policy statement or a third-party website (c). anonymous survey 
respondents from three more uK universities reported the standard share of equity taken by their university from their 
personal experiences (b). Full table with references are provided in Supplementary Table 2. the authors have made their 
best efforts to find the most up-to-date, publicly discoverable, online policy documents. rg, russell group. breported in 
anonymous survey. cFigure kindly provided by tto, specifying that such guidelines are only available to university of exeter 
staff. dspecified on third-party website and not part of a publicly available official policy statement. 
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It is clear that becoming familiar with the 
technology transfer process is an important 
part of the technology commercialization 
process for researchers. In the words of one 
academic bioentrepreneur, “The only thing 
I regret is that I didn’t get prepared for this 
process earlier.”
Note: Any Supplementary Information and Source 
Data files are available in the online version of the 
paper (doi:10.1038/bioe.2015.2).
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the academic entrepreneur with an extremely 
low stake from the get-go, for what was likely 
years of work, and will require many years 
and millions more to develop. Notably, the 
regions attracting the most life science invest-
ment and with the most successful life science 
spinouts (San Francisco Bay Area, Boston, 
and Cambridge UK) had four TTOs (Stanford 
OTL, UCSF ITA, MIT TLO, and Cambridge 
Enterprise) that rewarded the academics and 
investors the most. The data would suggest 
that TTOs taking less upfront and leaving 
more to the academic and investors who will 
actually carry the idea forward pays off in the 
long term. Simply put: holding a smaller piece 
of something is still more valuable than a large 
piece of nothing. 
 It is also worth noting that while a discussion 
on royalties was outside the scope of this study, 
it was clear from our research  that many uni-
versity TTOs “double dip” and take significant 
equity and royalty. Several bioentrepreneurs in 
the UK mentioned that the TTO also sought as 
much as two-thirds of the royalty stream.
Perhaps more disquieting than the out-sized 
equity and royalty stakes that  universities are 
claiming is the lack of transparency from 
many universities on this critical issue. Even 
private institutions (such as Harvard or 
Northwestern) are recipients of vast sums of 
government grants and under a government 
mandate to commercialize research produced 
from that money. The government has done 
this with the public’s interest in mind, and 
surely it is also in the public’s rightful inter-
est to know how these assets (funded by the 
taxpayer) are being allocated. Indeed, even 
for the universities for whom we have data 
regarding equity policies, it was often hidden 
deep within a jumble of legalese. To that end 
we encourage universities and research insti-
tutes receiving public monies to be fully trans-
parent in their equity and royalty policies, and 
not use these information asymmetries as a 
bargaining advantage against fledgling bio-
entrepreneurs. 
Moreover, while we did not assess Canadian, 
other EU (non-UK), or Asian TTOs, these 
information asymmetries exist regardless of 
geography. As such, the tools and insight pre-
sented here are just as applicable outside of the 
US and UK. 
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